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"The Worst of Both Worlds":' Defending
Children in Juvenile Court
Caterina DiTraglia*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1970, Judge Theodore McMillian and Dorothy McMurtry, writing about
Juvenile Court in Missouri, described the fertile soil from which "the basic
requirements of due process and fairness"2 grew in criminal proceedings against
children. They noted "[t]he unprecedented rise of crime and delinquency, [and]
the resultant hue and cry for law and order."3 They recognized that "juvenile
offenders were caught up in the same web that characterizes treatment of
criminal adult offenders-retribution, condemnation, deterrence and
incapacitation" which should trigger the important due process rights to
assistance of counsel, protection against self-incrimination, and confrontation of
witnesses.4
Twenty-seven years later, the same call to "get tough" on juvenile5 crime
has generated increasingly punitive laws for young offenders in Missouri.6
However, corresponding legal procedures, available to adults charged with
crimes have not kept pace in the juvenile system. For example, children are not
entitled to jury trials.7 The burden of proof for crimes alleged against a child on
juvenile probation is lower than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the standard
for an adult who reoffends.8 Waivers of counsel are commonplace.9 Prosecutors
* Director, Youth Advocacy Unit, Office of the Public Defender, St. Louis,
Missouri; Adjunct Professor, St. Louis University School of Social Service; Instructor,
George Warren Brown School of Social Work, Washington University; B.A. 1980, Drew
University; J.D. 1983, St. Louis University.
1. This was Justice Fortas' characterization of juvenile courts in Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
2. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
3. Theodore McMillian & Dorothy McMurtry, The Role of the Defense Lawyer in
Juvenile Court-Advocate or Social Worker?, 14 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 561, 562 (1970).
4. McMillian, supra note 3, at 565-84.
5. In Missouri, juvenile court has jurisdiction over children under seventeen years
who are charged with crimes. Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.031(3) (1994).
6. See generally Mo. REV. STAT. § 211 (1994 & Supp. 1997); Mo. REV. STAT. §
491 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
7. In re PAM, 606 S.W. 2d 449, 456 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
8. N.J.B.. v. State, 941 S.W.2d 782, 784 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). While the court
finds that a person may be found to be in violation of his or her probation based on a
quantum of evidence that is "clear and convincing" in both adult and juvenile court, the
court further holds that an adjudication (finding of guilt in juvenile court) may be made
on a felony and a misdemeanor using the lesser standard as well. For adults, a new
1
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have access to privileged treatment records and information, without court order,
regarding children who are transferred into the adult system, that they could not
access for adult offenders.' 0
Many involved in the juvenile court system continue to prefer informality
and a cooperative approach in making efforts to rehabilitate children. However,
the thrust of Missouri's Juvenile Code and related laws increasingly is focused
on the protection of the community over an individual child's confidentiality and
treatment needs. The juvenile system is, therefore, unavoidably antagonistic,
and because it lacks a tradition or historical practice which protects the rights of
children who are at risk of losing their liberty in an adversarial process (whether
through placement in a group home, institution, or an adult prison), the
protection of children's rights through effective assistance of counsel is one of
the crucial elements of the fair administration of justice in Missouri's juvenile
courts.
II. THE NEW STATUTES
In 1995, the Missouri General Assembly enacted major revisions to the
Missouri Juvenile Code. While the amended Juvenile Code states that the
conviction, regardless of a person's probationary status, must be based upon proof
beyond reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970); Lilienthal's Tobacco
v. United States, 97 U.S. 237, 266 (1877); State v. Simler, 167 S.W.2d 376, 382 (Mo.
1943).
9. While no statewide data is kept on how many children waive their right to
counsel in Missouri, in 1996 the Missouri State Public Defender's Office conducted a
study of juvenile court representation in the Public Defender System. PROPOSAL FOR
MISSOURI PUBLIC DEFENDER'S JUVENILE DIVISION (Aug. 1996). Approximately 2,442
cases were identified in which children were represented by attorneys from the Public
Defender's Office in fiscal year 1994, while close to 11,402 delinquency and criminal
cases were processed in Missouri's juvenile courts statewide according to the most recent
data available at the time from the Division of Youth Services (the agency charged with
collecting such information). MISSOURI JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS REPORT (1994).
While private counsel are appointed in certain circuits to handle juvenile cases, the
disparity in numbers suggests there are a significant number of cases where counsel was
waived. These totals do not distinguish between status offenses (such as truancy or
incorrigibility) law violations and certifications. See also Puritz et. al., A Callfor Justice:
An Assessment of Access to Counsel and Quality of Representation in Delinquency
Proceedings, A REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION JUVENILE JUSTICE CENTER,
44 (Dec. 1995).
10. Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.071.5 (Supp. 1997) states in part that prosecutors "shall
have access to the disposition records" if a child facing certification has prior
adjudications. Disposition records often contain statements of other family members,
peers, teachers, or school counselors, psychological, psychiatric or medical evaluations
or treatment records of a child. Prosecutors in adult court normally do not have the same
access to this information regarding adult defendants.
(Vol. 63
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state's "child welfare policy" remains "the best interest of the child," the
preference for achieving that policy by placement in the child's own home was
removed."
The basic behaviors which could result in a referral to juvenile court, such
as truancy, incorrigibility, conduct injurious to self or others, and violation of
laws, remain the same under the new code. 2 However, for certain offenses there
is no longer a minimum age at which a child can be incarcerated and forced to
stand trial as an adult. 3 For these offenses, a hearing before a judge to consider
certification for transfer to the adult system is mandatory at any age. For all
other felonies, the minimum age for certification has been lowered from fourteen
to twelve years.1
4
Once a child has been certified to stand trial as an adult, he or she is
permanently excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction.' 5 The only way a child
can be "uncertified" is if he or she is found not guilty after a trial.'6 The
irrevocable nature of the certification decision under the new law might well
reopen the question of whether certification decisions in Missouri are now final
orders which can be appealed. Prior to this change in the law, certification
orders were not considered "final" and did not trigger appellate rights.' A
motion for certification triggers access by a prosecutor in the adult system to the
child's social file, without having to secure a court order.'
8
Hearings in juvenile court are now open to the public if a child is charged
with a class A or B felony, or a C felony if a child has two prior felony
adjudications. Prior to enactment of the new Code, the pleadings and social
records of children convicted in juvenile court of class A felonies or murder
were the only juvenile court records open to the public. 9 Under the new law,
juvenile officers (social workers for juvenile court) may at any time share
information concerning any child or any case with victims, witnesses, school
11. Compare Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.011 (1994) with Mo. REv. STAT. § 211.011
(Supp. 1997).
12. Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.031 (1994).
13. Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.071.1 (Supp. 1997). Mandatory certification hearings
are now required for a child at any age, for the offenses of first degree murder, second
degree murder, first degree assault, forcible rape, forcible sodomy, first degree robbery,
distribution of drugs or if a child has two prior adjudications for offenses which would
be felonies if committed by an adult. It remains in the court's discretion, however, to
decide if a child should be certified.
14. Mo. REv. STAT. § 211.071.1 (Supp. 1997).
15. Mo. REv. STAT. § 211.071.9 (Supp. 1997).
16. MO. REv. STAT. § 211.071.10 (Supp. 1997).
17. In re T.J.H., 479 S.W.2d 433 (Mo. 1972); State v. Bills, 495 S.W.2d 722 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1973).
18. MO. REv. STAT. § 211.071.5 (Supp. 1997).
19. Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.321.1 (1994).
1998]
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personnel, police and prosecutors, or any custodian.2" Furthermore, the records
of felony proceedings in juvenile court which result in adjudication now are open
to the public MiT'the same manner that adult criminal records would be.2'
Under the new Code, placements with social service residential facilities
may be ordered for a determinate period of time.' In some respects, this means
a child can now be "sentenced" to live in a group home or social service
institution regardless of his or her treatment progress or capacity to function at
home.
For many years, an adult's prior adjudications in juvenile court have been
available to courts in the adult system for the purposes of sentencing. ' Under
recently enacted law, certain juvenile adjudications also can be used for up to
three years after the case is closed to challenge the credibility of a person who
testifies in court.24 Furthermore, an adjudication for any sexual offense (even
a misdemeanor) in juvenile court may be used to challenge a person's credibility
in court for the rest of his or her life. 5
Likewise, the "Safe Schools Act, ' 26 enacted by the Missouri General
Assembly in 1995, has imposed numerous requirements on Missouri Schools
regarding children who engage in criminal or delinquent behavior. This change
in the law allows schools to suspend or expel children who are adjudicated for
certain crimes, either for a substantial period of time27 or permanently.28 While
these laws may be a desirable means to the end of avoiding problems in the
20. Mo. REv. STAT. § 211.321.2(l)(a) (Supp. 1997). This statute does not
authorize the release of information disseminated by ajuvenile officer to any person or
agency not listed.
21. Mo. REv. STAT. § 211.321.2(2) (Supp. 1997).
22. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.181.4 (Supp. 1997).
23. Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.321.1 (1994); State v. Reagan, 427 S.W.2d 371 (Mo.
1968); State ex rel Whittaker v. Webber, 605 S.W.2d 179 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
24. Mo. REv. STAT. § 491.078.1 (Supp. 1997)
25. Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.078.2 (Supp. 1997)
26. The Missouri Safe Schools Act consists of Sections 160.011-160.457 and
167.020-167.627 of the Missouri Revised Statutes.
27. Mo. REV. STAT. § 167.161.2 (Supp. 1997) (allows a school to
consider juvenile court records at a hearing regarding a child's suspension or expulsion).
See also Mo. REV. STAT. § 160.261.3 (Supp. 1997) (providing that a student who is
determined to have brought a weapon to school may be suspended for a period of not less
than one year or expelled).
28. Mo. REV. STAT. § 167.171.3 (Supp. 1997). This Section provides that a student
may not be readmitted or enrolled in school if the student has been charged with or
convicted in juvenile or adult court for the following: (1) distribution of drugs to a minor;
(2) first degree murder; (3) second degree murder; (4) first degree assault; (5) forcible
rape; (6) forcible sodomy; (7) first degree robbery; (8) first degree arson; and (9)
kidnaping. While readmittance after an acquittal is permitted, it is not required by the
statute. Mo. REV. STAT. § 167.171.3 (Supp. 1997).
[Vol. 63
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schoolhouse, lack of access to education2 9 significantly defeats most efforts to
rehabilitate a child.
IlI. DEFENSE COUNSEL IN THE JUVENILE SYSTEM
A child who is charged with an offense in juvenile court is entitled to a
lawyer.3" In Missouri, if requested, the court must appoint counsel even before
a formal charge or "petition" is filed."a After a petition is filed, the court is
required to appoint counsel for a child if "necessary to assure a full and fair
hearing.332 Furthermore, a child cannot waive the right to a lawyer without the
court's permission.3 The court must provide counsel for a child whether or not
the child's parents wish to, or are able to, pay the legal fees.34
The apparent preference for legal representation of children codified and
interpreted in Missouri's law is not always appreciated in the day-to-day
processing of juvenile delinquency cases. This is evidenced by the number of
cases in Missouri involving children who are adjudicated without the benefit of
a lawyer to assess the validity of the accusations, to assist in presenting a defense
if the child has one, or to advocate for the child's wishes.35 This condition exists
for several reasons: (1) waivers of counsel may speed up the processing of cases
and alleviate some administrative burdens; 36 (2) the historical practices and
procedures in juvenile court that are an anathema to any criminal defense
lawyer's sense of fair process 37 still exist in some respects because there are no
29. Section 167.164 provides: "Any suspension issued pursuant to section 167.161,
or this section, or expulsion pursuant to section 167.161, shall not relieve the state or the
suspended student's parents or guardians of their responsibilities to educate the student."
Mo. REV. STAT. § 167.164 (Supp. 1997).
30. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
31. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 116.01(b)
32. MO. Sup. CT. R. 116.01(c)
33. MO. Sup. CT. R. 116.01(h)
34. State ax rel. Gordon v. Copeland, 803 S.W.2d 153 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
35. See supra note 9.
36. Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court: An Empirical Study of
When Lawyers Appear and the Difference They Make. J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1185, 1200 (1989).
37. See McMillian, supra note 3, at 562. Judge Theodore McMillian describes
juvenile court in Missouri prior to Gault: "Moreover, we judges knew that: (1) notice of
the charges at our informal hearings was meager; (2) the juvenile court officer,
supposedly a confidant of the child, was often his accuser; (3) no witnesses were
produced or swom, and hearsay was rampant; (4) the child was frequently called upon
or, in extreme cases, coerced to be his accuser; (5) the friendly judge was prosecutor,
defense counsel, and jury; and (6) neither the child nor his family were advised of the
right to counsel, or the right of the child to remain silent." Id. (citation omitted).
1998]
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formal procedural rules for the conduct of a juvenile court hearing;" and (3) the
appointment of counsel for a child is meaningless if large caseloads, lack of
training, and lack of resources render the representation a mere formality.39
A. The Need for Defense Counsel
Despite the fact that some juvenile court personnel, seeking to rehabilitate
children, view the presence of defense counsel in their midst as an interference,
the United States Supreme Court recognized in In re Gault that theparens pattie
approach to protecting the best interests of children charged with crimes has
failed miserably.' Upon coming to this realization, the Court found that the
right to assistance of counsel is an elementary safeguard for children in juvenile
court. The current punitive trend in Missouri law regarding juveniles charged
with crimes adds urgency to the findings of Gault and mandates that children
receive aggressive and well-informed defense representation. This
representation should be focused on protecting the legal rights and wishes of the
child rather than the child's perceived welfare or the welfare of the community,
matters which are better left to the courts, juvenile officers, legal officers
(lawyers for juvenile officers), and prosecutors.
In the final analysis, providing children with properly trained and funded
counsel actually contributes to the goal of reforming delinquent behavior in that
it has three important consequences: First, legal defense in general keeps the
system honest and serves as a check on the abuse of power.4 Second, if a child
feels that the process is fair, he or she is more likely to cooperate and accept the
38. Mo. REv. STAT. § 211.171.1 (Supp. 1997); See also Mo. REv. STAT. § 510.310
(1994), which governs procedure in equity: "In cases tried upon the facts without a jury,
the court shall rule upon all objections to evidence as injury cases."
Therefore, it appears that the formal rules of evidence apply to juvenile adjudicative
hearings. However, as a practical matter, judges often follow the guidelines set out in
Missouri Revised Statutes Section 211.171.1 (Supp. 1997), which states: "The procedure
to be followed at the hearing shall be determined by the juvenile court judge and may be
as formal or informal as he considers desirable." Presumably, Section 211.171.1 applies
only to the dispositional issues and not to the guilt/innocence issues but that is not the
reality in some courts.
39. Puritz, supra note 9, at 19-27.
40. In re Gault 387 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1967). Justice Fortas noted the procedural
differences between juvenile and adult courts and described the delinquency adjudication
as analogous to a Star Chamber proceeding. Id. at 18. Had Gerald Gault been an adult,
he would have been entitled to substantial protection under the United States and Arizona
constitutions and would have been subject at most to a minimal fine or two months
imprisonment for his offense. Id. at 29. As a juvenile, he was committed to a
correctional facility for an indefinite term of up to six years. Id. Justice Fortas ended his
comments by concluding: "Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not
justify a kangaroo court." Id. at 28.
41. Id. at 38 n.65.
.482 [Vol. 63
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outcome. Even the appearance of unfairness in a legal system undermines
confidence in, and respect for, the judicial process and fosters a desire to avoid
or rebel against what may be legitimate prescripts of the court. Any person,
particularly an adolescent, would resist the dictates of an authority that gave him
or her no voice and no advocate in the process. Finally, when a court, in
deciding disposition,42 recognizes and appreciates a child's interests, more
opportunities exist to inculcate the child in the effort to re-direct behavior,
making the child more likely to succeed and rendering the utilization of
expensive institutional resources unnecessary.43
B. Discovery as Advocacy in Juvenile Court
Defense representation in juvenile court operates in three basic stages: (1)
the adjudicatory stage, at which the child's guilt or innocence is at issue; (2) the
dispositional stage, at which the court must decide what to do with a child who
is adjudicated or convicted of a charge; and (3) the certification stage, at which
the court must decide whether the child should stand trial as an adult for the
charges alleged. Endemic to all three phases is the defense counsel's obligation
to engage in a meaningful discovery process in order to present a defense,
confront witnesses, and preserve the record for appeal. While discovery is
certainly not the only duty of defense counsel in juvenile court, it is often the
linchpin of a fair result and a meaningful appeal.
In juvenile court, discovery is governed by the Missouri Rules of Juvenile
Court" and the Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure.45 The Rules of Civil
Procedure allow for discovery of any matter relating to the claim or defense of
any party as long as the information appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
42. Disposition in a juvenile case is the action taken regarding a child after he or
she has been adjudicated or found guilty of a charge. The court may enter an order as
unrestricted (no court supervision, return the child home) or restricted (putting the child
in the custody of the Division of Youth Services for residential placement) as it deems
appropriate. The court is not limited in this regard by the nature of the charge.
43. Dean Macallair, Disposition Case Advocacy in San Francisco's Juvenile
Justice System: A New Approach to Deinstitutionalization, 40 CRIME & DELINQUENCY
84-95 (1994). Macallair profiles a study in which 243 youths, recommended for
commitment by their probation officers, were randomly selected to receive defense-based
disposition reports prepared by case advocates working on their behalf. The results of
the study established that 72% of the children with advocates as compared to 49% in the
control group (not given such defense advocacy) were diverted from state correctional
facilities. In 1994, the Fourth State Building Bond Issue was passed allocating $20
million for new residential facilities for children in the custody of Division of Youth
Services. In 1995, the Juvenile Crime Bill allocated $7 million for additional facilities
and staff. Id.
44. MO. Sup. CT. R. 118.03(b), Mo. Sup. CT. R. 119.05(e).
45. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 110.04, Mo. Sup. Cr. R. 56-61.
1998]
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discovery of admissible evidence.6 This rule gives defense counsel wide latitude
for investigation of the case against a child, both at the adjudicatory stage and the
dispositional stage. The discovery rules of criminal procedure, applicable to
adults, arguably are narrower in scope in that they are limited to nine basic areas
of inquiry.47 However, the criminal rules provide a convenient guide for an
attorney engaging in discovery in a case involving a child charged with a crime.
These rules require that defense counsel have timely access to such things as
police reports, lab reports and depositions of witnesses. Thus, reference to the
rules of criminal procedure by a defense attorney in juvenile court proceedings
likely would result in informed guilty pleas, expedited hearings, a minimum of
surprise, and an opportunity for effective cross-examination in juvenile court, as
are already fostered through the rules of criminal procedure in adult cases.4
In juvenile certifications cases, in which the court is to weigh all evidence
regarding the decision to relinquish jurisdiction,49 including testimony regarding
the facts of a particular charge," discovery regarding the facts of the underlying
case is crucial to presenting a defense. Because the amended Juvenile Code
permanently impacts the status of a child who is certified, yet may be innocent
of a charge,5 it is further incumbent upon defense counsel to investigate the
charges sufficiently to support the argument that an innocent or less culpable
46. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 56.01(b)(1).
47. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 25.03. The nine basic areas set out in the criminal rules of
discovery are: (1) names and addresses of witnesses and any memoranda of witness
statements; (2) statements of defendants or co-defendants and names and addresses of
witnesses thereto; (3) transcripts of grand jury proceedings; (4) transcripts of preliminary
hearing proceedings; (5) reports of experts; (6) books, papers, documents, photographs
or objects which the state intends to introduce; (7) record of criminal convictions of
state's witnesses; (8) information regarding photographic or electronic surveillance
relating to the offense charged; (9) any exculpatory information.
48. State v. Buckner, 526 S.W.2d 387, 392 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
49. State v. Garbe, 740 S.W.2d 266 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); The criteria for
certification are set out in Section 211.071.6 of the Missouri Revised Statutes, but this
Section indicates that the court is not "limited to" these factors. Mo. REV. STAT. §
211.071.6 (Supp. 1997). See also Mo. Sup. CT. R. 118.04(c).
50. State v. Tate, 637 S.W.2d 67, 71 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982), overruled by State v.
Carson, 941 S.W.2d 518 (Mo. 1998). In Tate, the court heard evidence that the
defendant had bludgeoned a thirteen year old girl, that the defendant failed to seek help
for the victim or report the crime and demonstrated no remorse or sorrow for what had
happened. In State v. Owens, the court considered evidence that the victim was grabbed
from behind and told she would be killed if she did not keep still. 582 S.W.2d 366, 376
(Mo. Ct. App. 1979). The court also considered testimony regarding the details of the
rape and beating of the victim including that a knife was used in the crime. Id. The
victim's blood stained clothes were introduced into evidence at the certification hearing.
51. Mo. REv. STAT. § 211.071.10 (Supp. 1997)
[Vol. 63
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child should not be certified, 2 or that the alleged crime does not warrant
certification. 3
Defense counsel, under the discovery rules, is entitled to access to a child's
social file and records because they are relevant to decisions regarding the
competency of a child to proceed, 4 responsibility for behavior," and disposition
or placement. Access to the social file is necessary because the rules of
procedure in juvenile court hearings are "as formal or informal" as the judge
considers desirable.-6 Thus, the procedures protecting an adult defendant in a
criminal prosecution do not necessarily apply in juvenile proceedings, making
the job of defense counsel much more difficult in juvenile proceedings than in
most proceedings in which an adult's liberty is at stake. Arguably, a lawyer
must be more prepared to object to, and cross examine, the testimony of juvenile
officers or other social service workers than he or she would be in hearings in
which the court strictly enforces rules of evidence and procedure. This makes
the content (or lack of content) of a child's social file relevant to demonstrate the
juvenile officer's degree of thoroughness in preparing the child's placement
recommendation. Since many courts give great deference to the opinions of
juvenile officers, 7 an attorney for a child who wishes to challenge a
recommendation must engage in thorough discovery and investigation of the
child's background and the basis of the juvenile officer's opinions.
Especially in certification cases, in which the juvenile court's decision is
based on "whether the child is a proper subject to be dealt with under the
provisions of [the Juvenile Code] and whether there are reasonable prospects of
rehabilitation within the juvenile justice system," 8 all social records from all
agencies that may have been involved with a child and all previous assessments
52. "It is not the prerogative of the juvenile court to make a determination in the
dismissal proceeding [certification hearing] whether the juvenile is guilty of the offense
charged." Tate, 637 S.W.2d at 71. However, it is certainly part of defense counsel's job
to advocate for a child prior to the hearing to avoid the permanent effects of certification.
The prosecutor, legal officer or juvenile officer, have the power to dismiss or reduce the
charges if the child is innocent or less culpable. Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.091.4 (Supp.
1997).
53. Section 211.071.6 includes factors which seem to require the court to consider
the facts of the charge in the certification decision. For example the court is to consider:
"(1) The seriousness of the offense alleged and whether the protection of the community
requires transfer to the court of general jurisdiction; (2) Whether the offense alleged
involved viciousness, force and violence." Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.071.6 (Supp. 1997).
54. Mo. Sup. Cr. R. 123.01(a)(2); Mo. REv. STAT. § 211.161 (Supp. 1997); Thomas
Grisso et al., Competency to Stand Trial in Juvenile Court, INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY,
1-20 (1987).
55. Mo. SUP. CT. R. 123.01(a).
56. Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.171.1 (Supp. 1997)
57. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 119.05 (court may order a social study by the juvenile officer).
58. Mo. REV. STA. § 211.071.6 (Supp. 1997)
1998]
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or treatment efforts should be reviewed in preparation to defend against the
motion to dismiss.59 For example, information regarding inappropriate or
inadequate intervention by social service agencies on behalf of a client who was
abused or neglected, alternative placements for rehabilitation that have not yet
been offered to a child, and mental health or developmental needs identified
regarding a child would be relevant and discoverable in preparation for a
certification hearing.6"
Furthermore, discovery often is important for record preservation. When
defense counsel fails to establish that the denial of due process in juvenile court
is prejudicial to the child, the appellate court is loathe to reverse for an abuse of
discretion. Therefore, in a situation in which defense counsel had only four days
to prepare for a certification hearing,6' or when defense counsel failed to object
to a certification hearing held without a written report of the juvenile officer
having been submitted to the court,62 the court of appeals looked to the issue of
what evidence existed, was investigated, or presented to establish that the child
was prejudiced by the court's actions. While this may be a difficult standard for
defense counsel to meet, the standard nonetheless must be met through thorough
investigation of the underlying charge, the prior services and current services
available to the child in the juvenile system, and the child's developmental and
treatment issues. Due to time constraints, much of this work may have to be
done after the certification hearing and presented in a motion to quash the
indictment or information and remand to juvenile court. After certification, the
motion to quash is required to preserve any juvenile court issues for appeal in a
criminal case.63
59. Under Section 211.071.6, the posture of the case at a certification hearing is
that the juvenile officer is moving that the court actually dismiss the case against the
child in the juvenile system so that the adult court can exercise its jurisdiction over the
child. Mo. REv. STAT. § 211.071.6 (Supp. 1997).
60. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); Watkins v. United States, 343 F.2d
278 (D.C. Cir. 1964). The Kent court stated:
The child is entitled to counsel ... and counsel is entitled to see the
child's social records. These rights are meaningless ... unless counsel is
given an opportunity to function.
[I]f the staff's submissions include materials which are susceptible to
challenge or impeachment, it is precisely the role of counsel to 'denigrate'
such matter. There is no irrebuttable presumption of accuracy attached to
staff reports.
Kent, 383 U.S. at 562-63.
61. State v. Selvy, 921 S.W.2d 114 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
62. State ex reL K.D.C. v. Copeland, 852 S.W.2d 417 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
63. Id. at 421.
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V. CONCLUSION
While the right of a child to defense counsel has been a fundamental due
process right for over two decades, the reality ofjuvenile court practice does not
foster the kind of basic constitutional protections that traditional criminal defense
practice encompasses. Although such protections have been perceived as
inappropriately adversarial in the past, it is certainly time to recognize that
children who commit crimes are treated more like adult defendants today than
ever before. An attorney who lacks knowledge of the case against his or her.
client for failure to engage in aggressive discovery compromises almost all of a
child's constitutional rights. Informed advocacy, rather than passive acceptance,
is the appropriate response to a juvenile system which may permanently
jeopardize the liberty interests of Missouri's youngest citizens.
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